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Federal Preemption and the South African
Sanctions: A Survival Guide for
States and Cities
I. INTRODUCTION
On Thursday, August 17, 1986, Fluor Construction Company, a
subsidiary of Fluor Corporation, was stripped of a 2.5 million dollar
contract to perform part of the expansion on the Los Angeles Con-
vention Center.1 Los Angeles' anti-apartheid policy was responsible
for removing Fluor Construction Company from the contract. 2 Fluor
Corporation had conducted about 40 million dollars worth of business
in South Africa during 1985. 3 This was the first time that the city's
unanimously enacted anti-apartheid policy had been invoked. 4 On
the state level, Governor George Deukmejian signed California's Di-
vestiture Bill on September 26, 1986, that would demand the state to
sell its investments in firms that conduct business in South Africa.5
While California's laws are not unique, they are the most contro-
versial since California could have the greatest effect on the South
African economy.6 The California divestment bill will affect an esti-
mated 11.4 billion dollars in investment, 7 whereas the next highest
estimate, according to the American Committee on Africa, is Iowa's
divestiture bill which could affect 110 million dollars.8 As of 1985,
1. Decker, Fluor Stripped of Convention Work, L.A. Times, Aug. 22, 1986, § I, at 1, col.
5.
2. Los Angeles has two separate anti-apartheid ordinances. One prohibits contracts
with companies that have investments in South Africa or subsidiaries whose parent companies
invest in South Africa. The other ordinance restricts the city from investing its funds in com-
panies that do business in South Africa.
3. See Decker, supra note 1. On Tuesday, September 17, 1986, one month after remov-
ing Fluor Construction Company from the contract for the Convention Center, the Los Ange-
les County Board of Supervisors awarded another subsidiary of Fluor Corporation a $304,345
contract to conduct engineering studies for the expansion of a jail in Saugus. L.A. Times, Sept.
17, 1986, § II, at 3, col. 4.
4. See Decker, supra note 1.
5. L.A. Times, Sept. 26, 1986 (late final) § I, at 1, col. 1.
6. Not only does California have the largest gross product of all the United States, it has
the eighth largest gross product of all the nations in the world. NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC
SOCIETY, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC ATLAS OF THE WORLD, at 68-69 (5th ed. 1981).
7. L.A. Times, Aug. 28, 1986, § I, at 1, col. 5.
8. Summary Chart on Public Fund Divestment, Am. Comm. on Africa, (Oct. 2, 1985)
(on file in the Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. office) [hereinafter Summary Chart]. It should be
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sixty-two cities and nineteen states have enacted some type of legisla-
tion to protest the oppressive South African government. 9 However,
in light of the recent federal legislation, these local laws may no
longer be valid. A debate has begun in Congress and in the munici-
palities and states as to whether the federal Act' 0 preempts all state
and local laws." So far, there have been no cases that specifically
address this issue, 12 nor has Congress definitively stated that the state
noted that the Committee has not determined the dollar effect that many of the state statutes
will have on South Africa, although it is unlikely that any of them will even approach Califor-
nia's estimated effect.
9. Summary Chart, supra note 8. The states that have enacted measures against South
Africa include, but are not limited to: Connecticut (divestment from companies that sell strate-
gic products to the South African government, and from businesses not in the top two catego-
ries of the Sullivan Principles); Iowa (similar to Connecticut's law but also requires divesting
funds from banks with loans to South Africa and divestment from companies doing business
there); Maryland (prohibits depositing state funds in banks that make loans to the South Afri-
can government or to South African companies, moratorium on investing state funds in com-
panies which invest in South Africa that do not meet the first two categories of the Sullivan
Principles); Massachusetts (divestment of all state pension funds from firms doing business in
South Africa); Michigan (prohibits depositing state funds in banks making loans to South
Africa, requires public educational institutions to sell all investments in companies doing busi-
ness in South Africa); Nebraska (requires divestment of pension funds from businesses in
South Africa not meeting the highest category of the Sullivan Principles); Wisconsin (invest-
ment of state educational funds in companies doing business in South Africa violates the state's
Civil Rights Act); Virgin Islands (requires divestment of the state's pension funds from South
African linked holdings within two years). The cities and counties that have ordinances re-
garding dealings with South Africa include, but are not limited to: Amherst, Mass.; Atlantic
City, N.J.; Baltimore, Md.; Berkeley, Cal. (enacted in 1979, this may be the earliest city ordi-
nance regarding South Africa); Boston, Mass.; Boulder, Colo.; Burlington, Vt.; Cambridge,
Mass.; Charlottesville, Va.; Cincinnati, Ohio; Cuyahoga County, Ohio; Davis, Cal.; East Lan-
sing, Mich.; Flint, Mich.; Fort Collins, Colo.; Fresno, Cal.; Gainesville, Fla.; Gary, Ind.;
Grand Rapids, Mich.; Hartford, Conn.; Jersey City, N.J.; Madison, Wis.; Miami, Fla.; Mid-
dletown, Conn.; Montgomery County, Md.; Newark, N.J.; New Orleans, La.; New York,
N.Y.; Oakland, Cal.; Philadelphia, Pa.; Pittsburgh, Pa.; Rahway, N.J.; Richmond, Va.; Rock-
land County, NY; San Diego, Cal.; San Francisco, Cal.; San Jose, Cal.; Santa Cruz, Cal.; St.
Louis, Mo.; Seattle, WA; Stockton, Cal.; Washington, D.C.; Wilmington, Del.; Youngstown,
Ohio. Id.
10. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5000-116 (Supp. IV 1986).
11. L.A. Times, Sept. 10, 1986, § I, at 1, col. 5; Warburg, Divestiture Will Survive: Claims
that Congress Silences States on S. Africa Are Wrong, L.A. Times, Sept. 12, 1986, § II, at 5, col.
3; L.A. Times, Sept. 11, 1986, § I, at 6, col. 1; Varat, State Actions on Divestiture Will Survive,
L.A. Times, Sept. 19, 1986, § II, at 5, col. 1; Smith, Apartheid Act Casts Doubt on Local Laws,
L.A. Times, Mar. 16, 1987, § II, at 5, col. 3.
12. In the author's opinion, a case challenging local sanctions will most likely arise in one
of two scenarios. In the first scenario, a company which desires a contract from the city will be
denied the contract, even though it may be the lowest bidder. This denial results because the
company has holdings in South Africa contrary to the city's ordinance prohibiting the city
from contracting with companies that have economic ties to South Africa. The company will
then seek damages by having the courts declare the ordinance invalid under the preemption
doctrine. Under the second scenario, the state could begin selling the stocks that it has in a
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laws are valid or invalid.' 3 In two places, the language of the Act may
arguably evince congressional intent to preempt the state and local
laws.' 4  However, the intent to preempt is both refuted 5 and up-
held. 16 The primary reason that this debate has become so heated is
company which have either investments or does business in South Africa. As the state with-
draws its funds, the company will be coerced into selling its South African investments in
order not to lose the state as a valuable investor. To keep from having to make this choice, the
company will challenge the divestment law under the preemption doctrine.
13. See generally Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5000-116 (Supp. IV
1986) (no provision explicitly preempts state and local anti-apartheid laws).
14. 22 U.S.C. §§ 5002, 5116 (Supp. IV 1986). Section 4 embodies the purpose of the Act
which is to "set forth a comprehensive and complete framework to guide efforts of the United
States in helping to bring an end to apartheid in South Africa .... " Id. § 5002 (emphasis
added). Section 606 of the Act prohibits Congress from withdrawing federal funds from cities
or states that condition contracts on the absence of South African ties "for 90 days after the
date of enactment of this Act." Id. § 5116. Presumably, after that time, Congress may with-
draw federal funds from states and cities that have anti-apartheid laws. Although neither
provision expressly preempts state and local laws, they may express some congressional dissat-
isfaction with the laws. However, it may be argued that section 606, by giving Congress the
ability to withdraw federal funds from localities with anti-apartheid legislation, implicitly rec-
ognizes that they will continue to exist even after the federal laws and thus intends that the
federal Act will not preempt state and local laws.
15. H.R. Res. 548, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). This resolution states:
Resolved, That in passing the bill, H.R. 4868, as amended by the Senate, it is not the
intent of the House of Representatives that the bill limit, preempt, or affect, in any
fashion, the authority of any State or local government or of the District of Columbia
or any Commonwealth, territory or possession of the United States or political subdi-
vision thereof to restrict or otherwise regulate any financial or commercial activity
respecting South Africa.
Id.
Statements in the Senate include: "I believe that it should be the right of any municipality
to undertake a conscious decision not to do business with those who might be giving aid and
comfort to the practice of apartheid"), 132 CONG. REC. S13,526 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1986)
(statement of Sen. D'Amato (R - N.Y.); "Preemption would remove.. . pressures and deny
Americans an opportunity to express their outrage over apartheid through activities directed
by State and local governments."), 132 CONG. REc. S14,645 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1986) (statement
of Sen. Rockefeller (D - W. Va.); "It is characteristic of our country that when people feel
strongly about ethical issues, moral issues, they act in local ways; and often in our history,
policy has come up from the lower levels of government rather than come down from the
higher ones."), 132 CONG. REC. S13,525 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1986) (statement of Sen. Moyni-
han (D - N.Y.).
16. 132 CONG. REC. S11,817 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1986) (statements of Sen. Lugar (R -
Ind.) that Congress had occupied the field and left no room for state and local anti-apartheid
laws); 132 CONG. REC. S 11,839 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1986) (Sen. Cranston's (D - Cal.) proposed
amendment to require divestiture in the federal Act was defeated); 132 CONG. REC. S13,526-
28 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1986) (amendment proposed by Sen. D'Amato to specify that the federal
Act did not preempt state law was defeated). With respect to Sen. D'Amato's proposed
amendment, Gerald Warburg, Sen. Cranston's adviser, has pointed out that the proposal was
only to keep the federal government from withdrawing funds from cities that refused to do
business with South African related companies where the federal law required cities to accept
the lowest bid. Warburg, supra note 11.
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that the federal sanctions against South Africa are much milder than
some state sanctions, especially California's. Republicans are arguing
for federal preemption, while the Democrats have delineated reasons
for maintaining the state and local sanctions. This is the opposite of
what generally occurs in a preemption debate. Usually, the conserva-
tive factions, armed with a philosophy of federalism, argue for pre-
serving states' rights while the liberals support uniform federal
action. 17 There has also been speculation that some states and many
cities secretly hope for a federal preemption of their own laws.'
8
This Comment addresses the issue of whether the state and local
laws must give way to the federal law under the preemption doctrine.
First, this Comment discusses the issue of apartheid and the debates
over the necessity of sanctions. Second, it will familiarize the reader
with the doctrine of preemption. Third, this Comment promotes rea-
sons why federal preemption does not invalidate state and local anti-
apartheid laws.
II. SOUTH AFRICAN APARTHEID
Reports about the violent, oppressive South African government
are in the news almost daily. The government of South Africa follows
a system of apartheid 19 which racially segregates the majority blacks
from the white minority. The British originally colonized South Af-
rica in 1806 after defeating the Boers.20 The Boers continued to fight
against Britain. In 1899, the British again fought and defeated the
Boers. 21 In 1948, the Boers' Nationalist Party disrupted Britain's
plan of racial equality by taking over control of South Africa from the
British and establishing apartheid. 22 The blacks comprise almost sev-
enty-five percent of the population, while whites make up fifteen per-
cent of the total population. 23 The remaining ten percent is Asian or
17. Varat, supra note 11.
18. L.A. Times, Sept 10, 1986, § I, at 1, 27, col. 5-6. Many cities, notably San Francisco,
have been hurt economically by their anti-apartheid ordinances. Some cities have also been
threatened by the federal government to ease the ordinances or face the possibility of decreased
federal funding. New York's Sen. D'Amato made a temporary deal with the Senate to keep
the federal government from withdrawing funds from the New York Transit Authority. [Tele-
phone interview with Mark Fabiani, Counsel to Mayor Bradley.]
19. "Apartheid" comes from the Afrikaans word for "separateness." Keegan, Is South
Africa Invulnerable?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 23, 1987, at 31.
20. Id. at 30-31.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 31.
23. Id. at 32-33.
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1988] South African Sanctions 697
colored. 24 Yet the whites dominate the country, holding virtually
every governmental position. Blacks do not have the right to vote. 25
Education in South Africa is segregated and extremely unequal. Ap-
proximately 913 rand are spent on white school children per capita
per year, while only 176 rand are spent on black school children.
26
The blacks have been assigned to thirteen percent of the land of South
Africa27 called the "Bantustans" or homelands 28 while "pass laws"
prescribe the conditions under which the blacks may remain outside
of these assigned areas.29 Other laws mandate the separation of facili-
ties and prohibit mixed marriages. 30 While some commentators be-
lieve that progress is being made, especially in the areas of political
representation and the work force,31 apartheid remains firmly en-
trenched in South Africa.
To protest this situation, many states and municipalities have en-
acted legislation to curb investments and business enterprises with
companies that do business in South Africa.32 It may have been this
flurry of action in the state and municipal governments that spurred
the federal government to adopt its own sanctions. 33 To impose or
not to impose sanctions has been hotly debated. Proponents of sanc-
tions, generally Democrats, claim that sanctions are the only way to
dismantle apartheid. Republican opponents hold that sanctions will
only worsen the plight of the blacks because they will be the first to
feel the impact of the sanctions.34 Many commentators also believe
24. Id.
25. 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 2334, 2338 (Nov. 1986).
26. Chettle, The Law and Policy of Divestment of South African Stock, 15 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus., 445, 467 n.100 (1983) (quoting M. VOORHEES, THE MODERNIZATION OF
APARTHEID 39-44 (1982)).
27. Id. at 448 (citing U.S. Dep't of State, Country Reports on Human Rights, 232
(1981)).
28. Id. at 448-49 (citing U.S. Dep't of State Country Reports on Human Rights, 232
(1981)). The Bantustans are areas within South Africa to which blacks are assigned depending
upon their physical characteristics. Id. Currently, there are ten different homelands and seven
identified black tribal groups. Keegan, supra note 19, at 32-33. The Bantustans are: Ciskei,
Transkei, Bophuthatswana, KwaZulu, Lebowa, Gazankulu, Venda, KaNgwane, Ndebele, and
Qwa Qwa. Id. The tribal groups are: Zulu, 30%; Xhosa Transkei, 25%; North Sotho, 15%;
Tswana, 13%; Xhosa Ciskei, 8%; Shangaan, 4%; and Venda, 4%. Id.
29. Chettle, supra note 26, at 448-49 (citing U.S. Dep't of State Country Reports on
Human Rights, 232 (1981)).
30. Id. (citing U.S. Dep't of State Country Reports on Human Rights, 232-33 (1981)).
31. See generally Chettle, supra note 26, at 450-57.
32. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
33. L.A. Times, Sept. 12, 1986 § I, at 1, 27, col. 5-6.
34. See generally, Veto of H.R. 4868, Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 132
CONG. REC. H88,648 (H.R. Doc. No. 273) (Sept. 26, 1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
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that the sanctions against the Pretoria government will adversely af-
fect blacks more than the whites that control the country. 35 Few peo-
ple disagree on this premise; however, many think that it is the only
way to end apartheid. 36 Many prominent black leaders in South Af-
rica and the United States, while agreeing that sanctions will at least
temporarily make conditions worse for the oppressed majority, hold
that the changes will not be significant and that in the end, sanctions
may liberate the blacks. 37
Amid much speculation about the wisdom of sanctions against
South Africa, a bill that finally became law was introduced in the
House of Representatives on May 21, 1986.38 The Republican Senate
approved the bill on August 15, 1986,39 and the House passed the bill
with a resounding 308 to 77 vote on September 12, 1986.40 The bill
was then sent to President Reagan who vetoed the legislation. 41 De-
spite President Reagan's strong opposition towards initiating sanc-
tions,42 the House voted to override the veto with a 313 to 83 vote on
September 29, 1986.43 When President Reagan was unable to muster
support from his own party, the Senate also overrode the veto, by a
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, D95-98; S. REP. No. 370, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 48, reprinted in
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 2334, 2365 (additional views of Sen. Pressler (R. - S.D.));
HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REPORT TOGETHER WITH MINORITY AND SUPPLE-
MENTARY VIEWS, H.R. REP. No. 99-638, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-14 (1986); Chettle, supra
note 26, at 469-73; Keegan, supra note 19, at 30-33; L.A. Times, Sept. 12, 1986, § I, at 12, col.
3; Szulc, To Impose Sanctions: Failures and Fiascoes, L.A. Times, Sept. 14, 1986, § V, at 2, col.
1; L.A. Times, Sept. 15, 1986, § I, at 1, col. 5; L.A. Times, Sept. 24, 1986, § I, at 6, col. 1; L.A.
Times, Sept. 27, 1986, § I, at 12, col. 1; L.A. Times, Oct. 3, 1986, § I, at 11, col. 5; L.A. Times,
Oct 4, 1986, § I, at 1, col. 6; L.A. Times, Oct. 7, 1986, § I, at 6, col. 1.
35. See, e.g., Veto of H.R. 4868, Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 132 CONG.
REC. H88,648, (H.R. Doc. No. 273) (Sept. 26, 1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS, D95-96; Chettle, supra note 26, at 469-73.
36. See, e.g., Chettle, supra note 26, at 469-73. Bishop Desmond Tutu has been an ada-
mant supporter of economic sanctions against South Africa stating that they are the only way
to peacefully end apartheid. Id. at 471 (citing J. Lelyveld, Cheerfully Defiant, Tutu is Home
but Botha is Firm Over Passport, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1981, at A6, col. 2.)
37. Id. at 471 n.ll1.
38. H.R. 4868, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 132 CONG. REC. H3157 (daily ed. May 21, 1986).
39. 132 CONG. REc. S11,880 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1986).
40. 132 CONG. REC. H6790 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1986).
41. Veto of H. R. 4868, Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 132 CONG. REC.
H88,648 (H.R. Doc. No. 273) (Sept. 26, 1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS, D95 (Nov. 1986).
42. President Reagan has consistently opposed the sanctions contending that they will
"seriously impede the prospects for a peaceful end to apartheid." Id. at D95. He has stated
that they are "sweeping and punitive," and that "[b]lack workers-the first victims of
apartheid-would become the first victims of American sanctions." Id.
43. 132 CONG. REC. E3349 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1986).
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vote of 78 to 21 on Thursday, October 2, 1986.44 The override was
expected by most.45 It was spurred by a phone call on Wednesday
night, October 1, 1986, from Roelof F. Botha,46 the Foreign Minister
of South Africa, to several senators warning them not to override the
presidential veto or else the South African government would cease
buying United States' grain and would block shipments of grain to
neighboring countries.
47
Yet despite the phone call, or perhaps because of it, sanctions
against South Africa became law. 48 Now, with the newly enacted fed-
eral law, the courts will have to address the issue of preemption.
49
III. ANALYSIS OF THE LAWS
A. The Federal Sanctions
The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (the Act),50 is
indeed comprehensive. Not only does the Act contain the controver-
sial sanctions, it provides for educational, social, and economic sup-
port for the dispossessed peoples of the apartheid regime.51 The Act
also stresses the need for peaceful negotiations between the South Af-
rican government and leaders of the African National Congress
(ANC) and the Pan African Congress52 (PAC) and other movements
opposed to apartheid. The Act notes Congress' strong distaste of all
44. 132 CONG. REC. S14,661 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1986).
45. L.A. Times, Sept. 13, 1986, § I, at 1, col. 2; L.A. Times, Sept. 17, 1986, § I, at 1, col.
6; L.A. Times, Sept. 18, 1986, § V, at 1. col. 1; L.A. Times, Sept. 24, 1986, § I, at 5, col. 1.
46. Botha is not to be confused with Pieter W. Botha, the President of South Africa.
47. L.A. Times, Oct. 3, 1986, § I, at 11, col. 1. Botha told the Times that the warnings
were not meant as threats but to "explain the consequences of these [sanctions] intended ac-
tions," and to impress the United States that " 'we [the South African government] are not
pushovers.' " Id.
48. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5000-116 (Supp. IV 1986).
49. There have been suggestions that the state laws could have been preempted when the
federal government first began considering sanctions against South Africa. Note, State and
Municipal Governments React Against South African Apartheid: An Assessment of the Constitu-
tionality of the Divestment Campaign, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 543, 569 (1985).
50. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5000-116 (Supp. IV 1986).
51. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 99-440, §§ 201-03, 100 Stat. 1086, 1094-96 (1986). Section 201
provides four million dollars for the fiscal years 1987 to 1989 to help victims of apartheid
finance their "education, training, and scholarships for the victims of apartheid;" section 202
allocates 1.5 million dollars every year beginning in fiscal year 1986 for direct and other legal
fees and assistance for political prisoners and their families who have opposed the apartheid
system through non-violent means; section 203, requires all departments of the United States
government which buy goods or services from South Africa to buy from enterprises that are
50% or more black. Id.
52. The ANC and PAC are black organizations that actively, and often violently, oppose
the apartheid government. Nelson Mandela was a former leader of the ANC.
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forms of violence committed by the South African government and
the opponents of apartheid, most notably the ANC. 53 Some members
of Congress have expressed concern regarding the communist infiltra-
tion and backing of the ANC, 54 and the Act specifically addresses this
"communist concern." In section 102(b)(4) it "encourage[s] the
ANC and Pan African Congress,... to... reexamine their ties to the
South African Communist Party." 55 The Act emphasizes the need to
dismantle apartheid and establish in its place democracy. 56 The Act
also requires the President to report on the communist activities in
South Africa ninety days after its enactment.57 A rider prohibits
United States citizens from importing Soviet gold coins. 58
However, sections 301 through 323, which embody the economic
sanctions have garnered the most attention.59 These provisions apply
mainly to United States nationals, which includes individuals and cor-
porations, 6° and to entities or agencies of the United States govern-
ment.61 These sections prohibit the importation of Krugerrands, 62 all
53. Several sections of the Act emphasize non-violence; and funds to the black organiza-
tions are hinged on the condition that the violent demonstrations against the apartheid govern-
ment will end. See generally 22 U.S.C. §§ 5012(b)(1), 2151n., 5036, 5038 (Supp. IV 1986)
(section 5012(b)(1): the United States supports the end of terrorist activities sponsored by the
African National Congress and the Pan African Congress; § 215 In.: funds for legal aid to
political prisoners to fight apartheid through non-violent means; § 5036: no assistance will be
given to an organization which has any member that has committed "gross violations of inter-
nationally recognized human rights"; § 5038: prohibits any aid from going to groups that prac-
tice "necklacing," which is execution by fire). Necklacing is accomplished by encircling the
victim with an automobile tire filled with burning fuel.
54. See S. REP. No. 99-370, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 23, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2334, 2354 (Nov. 1986) (additional views of Sen. Helms (R. - N.C.)).
Sen Helms' main complaint with the Act is that it will make the ANC which he describes as
"communist-backed" the "preferred successor to the present Government of South Africa."
Id.
55. 22 U.S.C. § 5012(b)(4) (Supp. IV. 1986).
56. Id. §§ 5012(b)(5), 5016(a)(2) & (d)(2), 5061-62.
57. Id. § 5099.
58. Id. § 5100.
59. Id. §§ 5051-73. These provisions are contained under the heading "Measures by the
United States to undermine apartheid." Id.
60. Id. § 5001(5). This section defines a national as a "natural person who is a citizen of
the United States. . . or is an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United
States," and as any "corporation, partnership, or other business association which is organized
under the laws of the United States, any State or territory thereof, or the District of Colum-
bia." Id.
61. See generally id. §§ 5051-73.
62. 22 U.S.C. §§ 5000-116 (Supp. IV 1986). Krugerrands are the gold coins sold by the
South African government to raise revenues.
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military articles made in South Africa,63 and articles produced or
manufactured by corporations owned or controlled by the South Afri-
can government." The section exempts strategic minerals that can-
not be obtained elsewhere because of the ban on importing items
produced in South Africa.65 This section also anticipates attempts to
circumvent the importation bans by prohibiting South African goods
from being imported to the United States indirectly via third
countries.
66
In addition, there are export prohibitions on computers and com-
puter software to any governmental agency of the apartheid system.
67
This section prohibits United States businesses from exporting com-
puter software to the South African military, the police, prison sys-
tems, and national security agencies. 68 The statute disallows airplanes
owned by South African nationals or the South African government
from landing in the United States. 69 Reciprocally, planes controlled
by United States nationals may not land in South Africa, except for
emergencies. 70 Another provision prohibits United States banks from
holding deposits from the South African government except where
the President of the United States has specifically authorized the de-
posits for diplomatic purposes.
71
The most sweeping provisions of the Act prohibit United States
nationals from making any new investments in South Africa. 72 One
provision prohibits loans from being made to the South African gov-
ernment;73 the other section prohibits loans to the private sector. 74
These sections make all new investments75 in South Africa unlawful.
63. Id. § 5052.
64. Id. § 5053.
65. Id. South Africa is among the top producers of uranium and manganese which are
strategic minerals. NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC SOCIETY, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC ATLAS OF
THE WORLD 203 (5th ed. 1981).
66. S. REP. No. 99-370,99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 13, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2334, 2347 (Nov. 1986).
67. 22 U.S.C. § 5054 (Supp. IV 1986).
68. Id.
69. Id. § 5056(a)(1).
70. Id. § 5056(b)(3).
71. Id. § 5058(a).
72. Id. §§ 5055, 5060(a).
73. Id. § 5055.
74. Id. § 5060.
75. A new investment is defined as a "commitment or contribution of funds or other
assets," and loans or extensions of credit. Id. § 5001(4)(A)(i) & (ii). New investments do not
include reinvesting profits "generated by a controlled South African entity back into that same
controlled South African entity," or assets which are necessary "to enable a controlled South
1988]
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In effect, these sections prohibit any United States citizen or corpora-
tion from lending money in the form of loans or other credit exten-
sions to either the government of South Africa or to private
corporations in South Africa. 76 These sections do not prohibit regular
sales to South Africa on open account or the refinancing of existing
loans, as long as no new credit is extended. 77 Additionally, the prohi-
bition on loans to the government of South Africa does not apply to
loans for education, housing, and humanitarian benefits that will be
"available to all persons on a nondiscriminatory basis,"' 78 while the
section outlawing new investment to the private sector "does not ap-
ply to a firm owned by black South Africans. ' '79
The federal law does not contain a mandate for individuals and
corporations to disinvest their holdings in South Africa. The Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, by a vote of seven nays to ten yeas,
defeated an amendment proposed by California Senator Alan Cran-
ston requiring firms to disinvest their South African holdings. 80 This
mandatory disinvestment is one of the major differences between the
federal and the California laws. The California and City of Los Ange-
les laws both require the state and the city, respectively, to rid their
pension funds of South African investments.
81
B. The California State Law
On Friday, September 27, 1986, California Governor George
Deukmejian signed Assembly Bill 134, the precursor to California
Government Code section 16640. Section 16640 imposes strict state
sanctions against businesses and financial institutions that do business
African entity to operate in an economically sound manner, without expanding its operations."
Id. § 5001(4)(B)(i). New investment also excludes debts and credits issued to South African
entities before the enactment of this Act. Id. § 5001(4)(B)(iii). The Act also allows transfers
of funds, shares, or credits issued before Congress enacted this Act as long as the transfer does
not result in the "payment, contribution of funds or assets, or credit to a South African entity,
a controlled South African entity, or the Government of South Africa." Id.
76. Id. §§ 5055, 5060.
77. Id.
78. Id. § 5055.
79. Id. § 5060(c).
80. S. REP. No. 99-370, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2334, 2338 (Nov. 1986).
81. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 16640 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987), Los ANGELES, CAL., ADMIN.
CODE div. 10, ch. 1, art. V (1986), Los Angeles City Employees' Retirement System's Anti-
Apartheid Plan, Proposed Final Draft, Aug. 22, 1985 (on file in the Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp.
L.J. office) [hereinafter The Plan].
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in South Africa.82 The statute will effect an estimated twelve billion
dollars of the state's money.8 3 The law requires the state to cease
investing its pension funds in businesses with ties to South Africa.
8 4
The introduction to the statute declares that "South Africa is the
only political system on this planet which constitutionally enshrines a
political system whereby a small minority of the population has the
power . . . to separate, discriminate against, and deny fundamental
political, social, and economic rights to 83 percent of the population
solely on the basis of race."' 5 Althoughmost of the introduction of
the statute denounces apartheid and declares California's opposition
to the system, it further states that investments with businesses in
South Africa are financially imprudent "given the political and eco-
nomic instability of South Africa."' 86 Additionally, the statute states
that restricting investment with businesses that do business in South
Africa will minimize the potential risk of loss that the instability in
South Africa creates.8 7 These words define the purpose of the statute
and are crucial to upholding the law in the face of the federal
sanctions. 88
The statute took effect on January 1, 1987, and will continue un-
til California has completely divested itself of investments in South
Africa.8 9 Divestiture will be complete by January 1, 1991.90 The stat-
82. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 16640 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987).
83. L.A. Times, Sept. 27, 1986, § 1, at 1, col. 5. The fiscal impact of the bill would
depend on several variables including:
1) the investment performance of the affected business entities' stock, bonds, securities,
and/or other evidences of indebtedness;
2) the comparison between the performance of affected business' stocks and the per-
formance of all other investment instruments;
3) the number and value of these investments in each fund's portfolio;
4) the investment performance of alternative investments;
5) the financial effect on businesses that do "pull out" of South Africa.
ARCHIBALD, DIGEST AB 134, PUB. I., FIN. & B.I. COMM. 3 (Aug. 27, 1986). Generally, the
more investment opportunities are restricted, the more the rate of return declines. However,
the trust funds that would be affected are so diverse that they may be able to adapt very well to
the South Africa restrictions. The state would incur additional costs in divesting the portfolio,
estimated between a few million dollars to hundreds of millions of dollars. Additionally, the
state would incur the costs of indemnifying officers who manage the trust funds and make the
divestment decisions. Id.
84. CAL. GoV'T CODE §§ 16644-45 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987).
85. 1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 1254(a).
86. Id. ch. 1254(h).
87. Id. ch. 1254(i).
88. See infra notes 159-84 and accompanying text.
89. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 16641 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987).
90. Id. § 16644.
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ute has four basic parts. First, it prohibits officials from using state
trust moneys9' to make new or additional investments; 92 or to renew
existing investments with business firms93 that have business opera-
tions94 in South Africa;95 or business arrangements 96 with the South
African government. 97 Second, it prohibits state moneys from being
deposited in financial institutions98 that make new or additional loans
to any South African corporation9 9 or to the government of South
Africa.°° Third, beginning January 1, 1988, the statute requires state
trust funds10 ' which have been invested or deposited in businesses and
financial institutions that do business with, or make loans to, either
South African corporations or the government, to be reduced by one-
third each year until 1991. By that year, the state will no longer have
91. "State trust moneys" is defined in the statute as "funds administered by the Public
Employees' Retirement Fund, the Legislators' Retirement Fund, the State Teachers' Retire-
ment Fund, the Judges' Retirement Fund, the Volunteer Firefighter Fund, the General Fund
portion if the University of California Retirement Fund, and any funds invested pursuant to
this part." Id. § 16640(i).
92. The statute defines "investment" or "invest" as committing to a business funds or
assets including loans, extensions of credit, security given for other assets, or "the beneficial
ownership or control of a share or interest in that business firm, or of a bond or other debt
instrument issued by that business firm." Id. § 16640(a).
93. The term "business firms" denotes "any organization, association, corporation, part-
nership, venture, or other entity, its subsidiary, or affiliate, which exists for profitmaking pur-
poses or to otherwise secure economic advantage." Id. § 16640(b). This definition does not
include non-profit businesses.
94. "Business operations" includes maintaining equipment, facilities, personnel, and the
ownership or possession of real or personal property in South Africa. Id. § 16640(d).
95. "South Africa" is the Republic of South Africa, the "Bantustans" or "homelands" or
any territory which is under the legal or illegal administration of South Africa. Id. § 16640(f).
96. "Business arrangements" refers to "projects, ventures, undertakings, contractual rela-
tions, or other efforts requiring ongoing periodic performance by either or both parties." Id.
§ 16640(e).
97. "'Government of South Africa' means the government of the Republic of South Af-
rica or its instrumentalities." Id. § 16640(g).
98. "Financial institution" is any bank, savings and loan association, credit union or
bank holding company licensed by the State of California or the United States, along with
"any insurance company, brokerage firm, securities firm, investment company, mortgage
banking company, finance company, personal property broker, mortgage loan broker, or con-
sumer credit company licensed to do business in this state" and any of its affiliates or subsidiar-
ies. Id. § 16640(c).
99. "South Africa corporation" refers to any business firm that is located in South Africa,
that does business principally in South Africa, or that is controlled by any business organized
under the laws of South Africa. Id. § 16640(h).
100. Id. §§ 16642, 16646.
101. "Trust funds" refer to the same funds as state trust moneys with the exclusion of the
General Fund portion of the University of California Retirement Fund. Id. § 16640(j); see
supra note 90.
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any trust funds associated with South Africa. 10 2 The fourth part of
the statute indemnifies state officials and the Regents of the University
of California from legal costs and judgments incurred as a result of
decisions to alter investments or deposits with South Africa or to
divest from South Africa.
10 3
The statute does exclude some businesses from its provisions. A
business firm which resolves not to expand or establish new business,
or not to renew existing business in South Africa is exempt from sec-
tion 16641. That section prohibits state trust moneys from being in-
vested in such business firms.1°4 Similarly, state trust moneys can be
deposited in financial institutions that resolve not to renew existing
loans or make new or additional loans to any South African corpora-
tion or to the government of South Africa.105 The statute also allows
financial institutions to renew existing loans or make new or addi-
tional loans to a South African corporation or the government of
South Africa to the extent necessary for repayment of loans made
before January 1, 1987.106 If a trust fund continues to hold invest-
ments in businesses or financial institutions that have business ar-
rangements with South African corporations or the South African
government, it must report to the Governor on the last day of January
every year that it holds such investments. 107 The report must include:
a) the name of the issuer of the investment; b) the book value of the
investment; c) the investment's amount, yield, and maturity date; d)
the business of the firm in South Africa and its business arrangements
with South African corporations or the government.
0 8
The statute does not state what penalties, if any, those refusing to
comply with the statute will suffer, although it does state that any
resolutions that the statute requires must be filed under the penalty of
perjury.'0 9 The statute also fails to specify the length of its duration,
although it is probably intended to last as long as apartheid continues.
102. Id. §§ 16644-45.
103. Id. §§ 16649-50.
104. Id. § 16641.5.
105. Id. § 16642.5.
106. Id. §§ 16642.7, 16647.
107. Id. § 16648.
108. Id.
109. Id. § 16643.
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C. The Sanctions of the City of Los Angeles
Los Angeles has instituted several ordinances, 110 as a market par-
ticipant,1 1' that require the city to halt buying goods and services
from the government of South Africa, and allow the city to refuse to
contract with companies that do business in South Africa.' 1 2 The
Board that manages the city's employees' pension funds has also
adopted plans to divest the pension funds of all investments in South
Africa."13 Each ordinance is considered separately.
1. The Divestiture Plan
The Divestiture Plan proposed by Mayor Tom Bradley and
adopted unanimously by the City Council' ' 4 is intended to put pres-
sure on the South African government to end apartheid. 1" 5 The
mayor attacked apartheid as "the most vicious and morally reprehen-
sible form of institutionalized racism in the world today."", 6 Like the
California state sanctions, the Divestiture Plan is also based on a mar-
ket participant theory that the city has the right to determine with
whom it will conduct business." 1
7
The city is required to phase in divestiture of the pension funds
over a period of five years in accordance with the Los Angeles City
Employees' Retirement System's Anti-Apartheid Plan (the Plan)." l8
Under phase one, within the first year, the Los Angeles City Employ-
ees' Retirement System (the Board) is required to inform all compa-
nies in which the Board has investments of the Plan. '9 The Board is
110. Los ANGELES, CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, art. V (1986) (contracting ordi-
nance); The Plan, supra note 81.
11I. See infra notes 159-84 and accompanying text.
112. Los ANGELES, CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, art. V (1986).
113. The Plan, supra note 81. Because the Pension Board is a separate entity from the Los
Angeles City Council, the City Council cannot control the Board's investment decisions or
policies. However, the Pension Board has adopted the Divestiture Plan which is being
enforced.
114. L.A. Times, Aug. 22, 1986, § 1, at 1, col. 5.
115. Bradley, Memorandum to the Media, Los Angeles City Initiatives Against South Af-
rica: Background Paper (May 7, 1985) [hereinafter Background Paper] (on file in the Loy.
L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. office).
116. News Release from the Mayor's Office, May 7, 1985 (on file in the Loy. L.A. Int'l &
Comp. L.J. office).
117. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
118. The Plan, supra note 81; see also The Los Angeles Fire and Police Pension System
Divestiture Plan, Draft, Aug. 13, 1985 (on file in the Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. office).
Both of these plans are substantially similar. Further references will be made to the City
Employees' Retirement Plan since it is more comprehensive.
119. The Plan, supra note 81, at II(A)(3).
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to implement phase two within twelve months after adoption of the
Plan. This phase requires the Board to encourage companies in which
the Board has investments and that do business in South Africa to do
everything in the company's power to end apartheid. 120 This includes
engaging in dialogues to encourage changes and reforms that will help
end apartheid' 21 and using the Board's stock voting rights to promote
the changes necessary to put apartheid to rest. Under phase three,
which is to take effect eighteen months after the Board adopts the
Plan, the Board must divest its assets in companies that furnish mili-
tary supplies and services to the South African Military, police, pris-
ons, and other government agencies that enforce apartheid. 22 Phase
four, which begins in the third year of the Plan, requires the Board to
divest assets from firms doing business in South Africa that have not
signed the Sullivan Principles.1 23 Phase five, which the Board shall
implement within four years of adopting the Plan, requires the Board
to divest assets from companies that do business in South Africa and
have signed the Sullivan Principles, but which do not submit to the
monitoring of the Arthur D. Little Company, or obtain the highest
rating from the Arthur D. Little Company. 24 The sixth and final
phase is to take place five years after the Board adopts the Plan and
requires the Board to divest its assets of all companies that do busi-
ness in South Africa. 25 The Plan excludes companies that are taking
active steps to eliminate apartheid from each of these phases.' 26 It
120. Id. at II(B).
121. Id.
122. Id. at II(C)(4).
123. Id. at II(D)(4). The Reverend Leon Sullivan of Philadelphia established principles
for United States corporations to follow governing equal employment and living conditions.
The six principles are briefly: 1) Nonsegregation of all eating, comfort, locker room, and work
facilities; 2) Equal and fair employment practices for all employees; 3) Equal pay for all em-
ployees doing equal or comparable work; 4) Initiation and development of training programs
that will prepare blacks in substantial numbers for supervisory, administrative, clerical, and
technical jobs; 5) Increasing the number of blacks in management and supervisory positions;
and 6) Improving the quality or employees' lives outside the work environment including
housing, transportation, education, recreation, and health facilities. Sullivan, Agents for
Change: The Mobilization of Multinational Companies in South Africa, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 427 (1983).
124. The Plan, supra note 81, at II(E)(4). Arthur D. Little Co. is an accounting and man-
agement firm which has developed a questionnaire to determine whether corporations involved
in South Africa have adhered to the Sullivan Principles. These questionnaires are submitted
annually and the results are available to investors. Attachment I, Sullivan Principles (from the
Mayor's office) (on file in the Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. office).
125. The Plan, supra note 81, at II(F)(4).
126. See generally id.
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also requires the Board to obtain the advice of independent financial
and legal counsel before each phase goes into effect. 127
2. The Contracting Ordinance
The purpose of the Contracting Ordinance, enacted on July 2,
1986, is to allow the City of Los Angeles, as a market participant, to
restrict the city's contracts to persons or entities1 28 which do not do
business129 in South Africa.' 30 The Contracting Ordinance precludes
the city from entering into new contracts, renewing existing contracts,
or exercising contract options with the "(1) [the] government of South
Africa; (2) [a]ny person or entity organized under the laws of South
Africa; (3) [a]ny person or entity who owns property or is doing busi-
ness in South Africa."13' The Contracting Ordinance also requires all
persons or entities seeking to contract with Los Angeles to fill out a
form declaring all business ties the person or entity has with South
Africa. 132
To protect the city's financial interests, the Contracting Ordi-
nance contains exemptions.13 3 These exemptions include contracts
that must be awarded through competitive bidding; contracts for sole
source goods and services; contracts where the ordinance would ex-
clude all but one bidder; and contracts for news publication services
and transportation. 34 Furthermore, the Contracting Ordinance ex-
cludes contracts where its application would result in significant loss
of quality or additional costs to the city.
35
Although these exemptions to the ordinance may appear to
127. Id.
128. "Person or entity" includes corporations, partnerships, clubs, associations, parent,
subsidiary, and affiliated companies. Los ANGELES, CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, art.
V, § 10.31.1(f) (1986).
129. "Doing business" refers "to any person or entity engaged in the activity of business,
commercial enterprise, trade, calling, vocation, profession or any means of livelihood, whether
or not carried on for gain or profit." Id. § 10.31.1(c).
130. Id. § 10.31. "South Africa" includes the government of the Republic of South Africa
and any public or quasi-public agencies. Id. § 10.31.1(e).
131. Id. § 10.31.2.
132. Id. § 10.31.3.
133. Id. § 10.31.4. The exemptions are necessary because under the Charter of the City of
Los Angeles, certain contracts must be bid for competitively. Where the city is awarding
competitively bid contracts, it cannot exclude companies that have business dealings in South
Africa. Bradley, Memorandum to the Media, The City of Los Angeles' Anti-Apartheid Con-
tracting Policy, (March 18, 1986) (on file in the Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. office) [hereinaf-
ter Contracting Policy].
134. Id.
135. Id.
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render the city's laws almost ineffectual in its fight against apartheid,
the Contracting Ordinance does apply to all personal service contracts
with law firms, accounting firms, and other private consultants,1 36 and
all contracts under $25,000.137 In addition, the ordinance will affect
all bond underwriting work by the Community Redevelopment
Agency, Department of Water and Power, and all other city agen-
cies, 138 as well as all Requests for Proposals. 139 The Contracting Or-
dinance will affect an estimated $101,199,000 annually.'4° Therefore,
despite the seemingly endless exemptions, the impact of the Con-
tracting Ordinance will be substantial. At the same time, the exemp-
tions are necessary to preserve Los Angeles' financial stability and
fulfill its obligation not to waste revenues.
IV. THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
The preemption doctrine is a useful tool created by the Supreme
Court pursuant to the supremacy clause' 4 ' to invalidate state laws.
The Court invokes the doctrine when it decides that a state law can-
not coexist with a federal law because they both regulate the same
area. There are various other clauses in the Constitution on which
the Court can draw to invalidate state laws, most commonly the com-
merce clause, 142 the due process clause, 143 the equal protection
clause,' 44 and the privileges and immunities clause.' 45 However, the
Court prefers to invalidate state laws under the preemption doc-
trine' 46 to avoid a constitutional inquiry into the validity of the state
law.' 47 Even under this approach, the Court cannot completely evade
136. Summary: Anti-Apartheid Contracting Ordinance, Second Draft (on file in the Loy.
L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. office).
137. Contracting Policy, supra note 133, at 7.
138. Summary: Anti-Apartheid Contracting Ordinance, Second Draft (on file in the Loy.
L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. office).
139. Contracting Policy, supra note 133, at 7.
140. Id. at 8. This total comes from an estimated annual expenditure of $40,577,000 in
Requests for Proposals, and $60,199.000 in contracts awarded under $25,000 each. Id.
141. U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 2.
142. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
143. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See generally Note, Preemption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construc-
tion, 12 STAN. L. REV. 308 (1959). This is also similar to the Younger doctrine, where the
court will only decide the constitutionality of a state law after it has tried to invalidate it on
other non-constitutional grounds. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
147. Note, supra, note 146, at 318.
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the Constitution since it must determine whether the federal law is
constitutional.
Preemption arises from the supremacy clause in the Constitu-
tion 48 which provides that the Constitution and the federal laws shall
be "the Supreme Law of the Land."1 49 From this simple clause, the
courts have developed an analysis composed of five separate parts.
First, there must be a valid federal law.'5 0 Second, there must be a
valid state law. Once these primary elements are established, the
court will determine whether the federal law displaces the state law by
making three inquiries: first, whether the state law conflicts with fed-
eral law; 51 second, whether Congress intended to occupy the field;
52
and third, whether the area is of dominant federal concern and there-
fore closed to the states. 53 While both of the first two elements must
be present for federal law to preempt state or local laws, only one of
the three elements needs to be present. 5 4 Each of these elements is
considered independently as it pertains to the area of federal sanctions
against South Africa and to local divestment legislation on the state
and municipal levels. 155
148. U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 2.
149. Id.
150. For the remainder of this Comment, the analysis for preemption of state laws will
also apply to municipal ordinances since the doctrine applies to both without distinction. The
only difference in the analysis for state and municipal laws is that municipal acts are subject to
"double" preemption first by state laws, second by the federal laws. State preemption of mu-
nicipal ordinances will not be addressed here.
151. L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 377 (1978).
152. Id. at 384.
153. Id. at 378.
154. See Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926) (federal law occupied
the field); Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467
U.S. 461 (1984) (federal law occupied the field); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218
(1947) (state law conflicted with federal law); Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46 (1981) (state
law conflicted with federal law); Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist., 469 U.S.
256 (1985) (state law conflicted with federal law); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los
Angeles, 475 U.S. 608 (1986) (state law conflicted with federal law); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52 (1941) (area of dominant federal interest); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956)
(area of dominant federal interest and federal law occupied the field); Zschernig v. Miller, 389
U.S. 429 (1968) (area of dominant federal interest).
155. "Divestment" and "disinvestment" are commonly interchanged. "Disinvestment"
actually refers to withdrawing money that has previously been invested. "Divestment" refers
to ridding oneself of stocks. Chettle, supra note 26, at 445.
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A. Federal and State Laws
1. Federal Law
"Throughout U.S. history, economic sanctions have been used as
an important instrument of U.S. foreign policy.115 6 Economic sanc-
tions are a means by which the United States' people, through their
government, can espouse ideals and incite change. The sanctions
against South Africa join a long list of economic sanctions that the
United States has enforced against many countries including: Rhode-
sia, Uganda, Cuba, Iran, Vietnam, Korea, Cambodia, Libya, the
U.S.S.R., Poland, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua. 57 Congress can, con-
sistent with the Constitution, enact federal legislation imposing eco-
nomic sanctions against other nations as part of its foreign policy.
2. State Laws
State laws that come before the courts carry with them a pre-
sumption of validity. Under their police powers, states may regulate
for the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens. The divestment
laws can be seen to protect the welfare of the states' citizens. For
example, the laws ensure that pension funds to which state employees
are entitled upon retirement are not invested in South Africa's unsta-
ble economy. The Supreme Court has held that protecting the state's
money is a local concern and within the province of the police
powers. '5 8
The legitimacy of state laws may, however, meet up with a con-
stitutional challenge. The federal government has the exclusive power
under the Constitution to regulate foreign affairs.159 Where Congress
has regulated in the area of foreign affairs, the states may neither add
to nor alter the federal laws. 16° At first glance, the state and local
actions certainly appear to regulate foreign affairs. Yet, the State of
California and the City of Los Angeles have been very careful to artic-
ulate that the purpose of the laws is to protect their investments.
There may be some effect on foreign affairs; however, because the
state laws stem from legitimate state power they will not be held as
156. House Comm. On Foreign Affairs, Report Together with Minority and Supplementary
Views, H.R. REP. No. 99-638, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1986).
157. Id.
158. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356-57 (1976).
159. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941). U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, art .J,
§ 10, cl. 2, art. I, § 10 cl. 3.
160. Id. For a discussion of Hines, see infra notes 338-40 and accompanying text.
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interfering with foreign affairs.' 6' Where federal laws and state laws
regulate the same area but for different purposes the federal law will
not preempt the state law. 16 2 For these reasons, the state laws are not
unconstitutional regulations of foreign affairs.
Moreover, state and local governments, under their police pow-
ers, have the ability to determine their own investments and how and
where they will spend their money under the market participant the-
ory. 163 The market participant theory allows the state to be treated as
a private party when it is acting in the market as any other private
individual. Under this theory, where the state is buying or selling
goods, or contracting for services, it is allowed to decide with whom it
will do business, just as a private corporation does. In this "private
capacity" the state is free from all federal regulations except for those
that would be imposed on private businesses. Although the market
participant theory was developed to combat challenges against state
regulations under the commerce clause,164 the theory is equally appli-
cable to state decisions to divest their portfolios of South African in-
vestments. 165 In the divestment context, the state is like any other
individual deciding to whom it will entrust its retirement funds.
Therefore, the state laws could withstand a constitutional commerce
clause attack.
B. Conflict Between the Federal and State Laws
One way in which a federal law can preempt a state law is if the
laws conflict. A conflict can arise in two ways. First, it may be im-
possible to follow both the state and federal laws. This is referred to
as an actual or direct conflict. The second type of conflict is not an
actual or direct conflict in the sense of impossibility, but rather, that
the state law interferes with the "purposes and objectives" of the fed-
eral laws. 166 Each type of conflict will be considered separately.
1. Actual Conflict
Where there is an actual conflict between the state and federal
161. Note, supra note 49, at 572.
162. See infra notes 253-84 and accompanying text.
163. Note, supra note 49; Varat, supra note 11.
164. See generally Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976); White v. Mas-
sachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S.
429 (1980).
165. Note, supra note 49, at 554-66.
166. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
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law, federal law will prevail.1 67 The analysis in this context is fairly
simple. If a person or entity cannot follow both the federal and state
laws at the same time, then the state law cannot exist. This is true no
matter how much interest the state has in the matter nor how local
the concern. 68 Ridgway v. Ridgway 169 illustrates both an actual con-
flict and that federal law may prevail even where there is a strong
state interest.
In Ridgway, a Sergeant in the United States Army had desig-
nated his second wife as the beneficiary of his life insurance policy
which was provided pursuant to a federal law. 170 When the insured
service member died, the federal law required the proceeds to be paid
to the named beneficiary or to the surviving spouse, and further stated
that the policy could not be attached or seized. 17 ' Upon Sergeant
Ridgway's death, his first wife filed a claim for the insurance proceeds
on behalf of their children. 72 The state court awarded the policy to
the former wife on behalf of the children from the first marriage who
were not beneficiaries under the law. 173 The Supreme Court reversed
this decision stating that although the state had an interest, 74 federal
law must prevail because there was an actual conflict. 75
The conflict existed because it was impossible to follow both the
federal and state laws. The federal law required the policy to be paid
to the second wife and prohibited attachment, whereas, the state law
required it to be paid to the first wife and put in trust for the chil-
dren. 76 This case demonstrates the strength of the preemption doc-
trine. Family law has traditionally been left to the states with little
federal interference since the state has a very strong interest in the
167. See generally Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 435 U.S. 151, 164 (1978); Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46 (1981); Fidelity Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982); Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood
School Dist., 469 U.S. 256 (1985); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S.
608 (1986).
168. Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 258-60 (1985) (fed-
eral statute which ensured that states could use revenues from federal lands for any govern-
ment purpose preempted the state statute which required the money to be spent just as other
general taxes). Id.
169. 454 U.S. 46 (1981).
170. Id. at 48-49.
171. Id. at 53-54.
172. Id. at 49.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 54.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 52-53.
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welfare of its residents. However, even this strong state interest in
familial well-being can be displaced by federal law when there is a
conflicting state law.
The Court in De Canas v. Bica, 17 7 stated that where there is a
state and a federal statute on the same subject, they should be read
together and that only the parts of the state statute that actually con-
flict with the federal law should be invalidated. 78 This is also the
approach that the Court took in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 1
79
There, the Court struck down parts of a Washington state law that
conflicted with the federal law but upheld the parts that were not ac-
tually in conflict with federal laws.' 80 Partial invalidation is not nec-
essary with the state and city anti-apartheid laws because no part of
the state anti-apartheid law conflicts with the federal sanctions.
Furthermore, simply because the state law regulates in the same
area as the federal law does not mean that the two laws conflict. De
Canas involved a California statute that prohibited employers from
hiring aliens if it would adversely affect California residents.' 8 ' The
Court upheld the California statute because it did not conflict with
the federal statute regulating aliens. Moreover, admitting aliens into
the United States was exclusively a congressional concern and not
every statute involving aliens dealt with admitting them.8 2 There-
fore, according to the court in De Canas, the state and local anti-
apartheid statutes would be valid if they regulate the same area but do
not directly conflict with the federal statute.
The state and local anti-apartheid laws will survive the "actual
conflict" test because it is not impossible to enforce both laws simulta-
neously. A businessperson can adhere to both laws at the same time
without violating either law. Thus, there is no actual conflict between
the state and federal laws.
2. Conflict with the Object and Purpose
Where there is no direct conflict with the federal law, the Court
will only preempt a state law if it is the "clear and manifest purpose of
Congress" to do so.' 8 3 To determine the intent of Congress, the Court
177. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
178. Id. at 357-58 n.5.
179. 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
180. Id. at 171-73.
181. 424 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1976).
182. Id. at 351-52.
183. Id. at 357.
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will look to the language of the statute and its legislative history.18 4
With the South African sanctions, Congress' intent is unclear. The
language of the Act evinces congressional dissatisfaction with the lo-
cal statutes, 8 5 yet it also seems to recognize that they will continue to
exist alongside the federal sanctions.
18 6
The legislative history is also ambiguous. According to Senator
Lugar, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairperson and co-
author of the Act, the federal law leaves no room for local actions.
8 7
There was also an amendment introduced declaring that the federal
sanctions would not preempt the state and city laws. That amendment
was defeated. 18  However, the record is equally supportive on the
other side. The House of Representatives passed a resolution that the
federal laws would not oust the local actions. 8 9 While a resolution is
not binding law, it certainly demonstrates the intent of Congress not
to preempt state laws. Thus, the actual intent of Congress is unclear
and the courts will have to decide the preemption issue according to
their previous preemption decisions.
In some cases, the Court has held that federal law could preempt
state law where the state law stood as an "obstacle to the full purposes
and objectives of Congress."' 90 This is essentially an argument that
the laws conflict since the federal law cannot fully perform its purpose
with the state laws. In Michigan Canners & Freezers v. Agricultural
Marketing & Bargaining Board,'9' the Court preempted a state law
that allowed producers to form exclusive associations to represent
other producers in the area. 92 The law required all producers,
whether they chose to belong to the association or not, to pay fees and
to be bound by the contracts that the association formed with agricul-
tural processors. 93 In invalidating the state law, the Court looked to
the language of the statute, which explicitly prohibited coercing a pro-
184. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 84, 85 (1983).
185. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, Pub. L. No. 99-440, §§ 4, 606, 100 Stat 1086,
1089, 1116.
186. Id. § 606.
187. 132 CONG. REC. SI1,817 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1986).
188. 132 CONG. REC. S13,526 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1986).
189. H.R. Res. 548, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); 132 CONG. REc. H6767 (daily ed. Sept.
12, 1986).
190. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
191. 467 U.S. 461 (1984).
192. Id. at 469-78.
193. Id. at 477.
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ducer to enter into an association.194 The Court also examined the
legislative history of the Agricultural Fair Practices Act and found
that Congress had intended to leave farmers free and independent of
an association unless they chose to join. 195 The state law required all
farmers to comply with the bargains and pay fees to the exclusive
association regardless of their desire to belong to an association or
not. This operated as an obstacle to the Congressional purpose,
which was to allow the farmers to remain independent of associa-
tions. 96 The state and local anti-apartheid sanctions which go be-
yond the federal sanctions do not create an obstacle in Congress'
attempt to eliminate apartheid. The state sanctions further this pur-
pose. They clear the path, rather than create an obstacle.
A state law can conflict with the object and purpose of a federal
law if it regulates "further" than its federal counterpart. A state law
is said to go "further" than a federal law when the state law regulates
in the same area as the federal law but is stricter in that it imposes
more obligations, or more restrictions than the federal law. At one
point, the Supreme Court held that state laws that did not conflict but
went further than federal laws were invalid. 97
[T]he Court has tempered its undifferentiated hostility to state reg-
ulation of matters already regulated by the federal government.
Generally speaking, the Court will now sanction state regulations
that supplement federal efforts so long as compliance with the let-
ter or effectuation of purpose of the federal enactment is not likely
to be significantly impeded by the state law. 98
Under this view, the Court should uphold the state and local sanc-
tions. They do not impede the federal purpose. The federal laws can
be followed and given full effect even if the state laws are enforced. In
fact, rather than impairing the federal laws, the state laws actually
augment them.
The Supreme Court has invalidated state laws that did not di-
rectly conflict with the federal law but went further. 199 The Court has
194. Id. at 470-71.
195. Id. at 471-77.
196. Id.
197. L. TRIBE, supra note 152, at 379.
198. Id.
199. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608 (1986) (city regula-
tion requiring a strike to be settled before it would renew a taxi cab company's franchise was
invalid because it interfered with the NLRA which did not condition franchises on the settle-
ment of a strike); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Co., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (state law regulating the
conduct of grain storage warehouses and grain dealers was invalidated because it went further
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also upheld state laws that have gone further than federal laws. In
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul,20° the Court upheld a Cali-
fornia law requiring that avocados sold within California be at least
eight percent oil by weight where the federal standards certified avo-
cados as ready for sale according to age not weight. 20 1 The result of
the California statute was that some avocados grown in Florida and
ready for sale according to the federal standards were excluded from
sale in California because they did not meet the oil content test.
2°2
The purpose of both the federal and the California statutes was to
maintain quality in the avocado market, so that consumers who had
been disappointed by unpalatable avocados, would not stop purchas-
ing avocados. 20 3
The Court reasoned that the California law was not preempted
by federal law because it was not impossible to follow both the federal
and the California statutes.2°4 Florida's avocados were not com-
pletely excluded from the market, 20 5 and the Florida growers could
also comply with both statutes by leaving the avocados on the tree for
a longer period of time to develop the oil content required by Califor-
nia law.20 6 Therefore, although the statutes were different and aimed
at the same purpose, 20 7 the state law was nonetheless valid because
"both regulations [could] be enforced. '208
This argument also serves to uphold the validity of the California
state and local laws against South Africa. The state and city sanctions
certainly differ from the federal sanctions, yet they can all be com-
plied with simultaneously without "impairing the federal superinten-
dence of the field."' 20 9 For example, a trust held by the state of
California could make no new investment in firms doing business in
South Africa according to federal210 or state law. 21" Further, the state
than the federal laws, the court also found congressional intent to preempt state law to provide
for uniformity).
200. 373 U.S. 132 (1962).
201. Id. at 133-34.
202. Id. at 134.
203. Id. at 137-38.
204. Id. at 142-43.
205. Id. at 140.
206. Id. at 143.
207. See infra notes 253-284 and accompanying text for discussion on the importance of
the purpose.
208. 373 U.S. at 143.
209. Id.
210. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440 § 310, 100 Stat.
1086, 1102.
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would have to reduce its investments in South Africa until it had
completely divested its South African holdings to comply with the
state statute.212 Although divestment is not required by federal law,
the state's divestment requirement in no way contravenes the federal
statute or purpose. Rather it aids the law by putting additional pres-
sure on the South African government.
The California law actually complies with the federal law and
then goes further. The state law is more stringent than the federal
laws. The Court has upheld state laws that go further than federal
laws.2 13 Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson2 14 is very similar to Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers.215 In Cloverleaf, the court upheld a state
law that excluded butter from the markets because it did not meet the
state standards even though it was marketable according to the fed-
eral laws. 2 16 The Court stated that absent specific congressional in-
tent to the contrary, a state could impose higher standards for its
consumers.217 With the state anti-apartheid sanctions, the public has
an interest in investing the state pension funds in stable economies to
ensure maximum return on its investments. Where the consumers
have an important interest, federal regulations do not automatically
displace the state regulations. 218 Certainly a worker's interest in her
211. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 16641 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987).
212. Id. § 16645.
213. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942) (upheld a state law that im-
posed higher standards on butter than the federal laws federal laws); Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1962) (upholding a state law that excluded avocados from sale
in California although they were marketable according to federal law); Huron Portland Ce-
ment Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (upholding a state law requiring additional
inspection of federally licensed seagoing vessels). But see Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
272 U.S. 605 (1926) (invalidating a state law that regulated more stringently the same area as
federal law). Napier can be distinguished from the cases upholding state laws that have gone
further than their federal counterparts. In Napier, the Court not only found that the state law
regulated the same area as the federal law, but also that Congress intended to preempt the state
laws. Id. Additionally, the state laws in Napier regulated for safety which was for the same
purpose as the federal law. Id. at 609-10. In Florida Avocado Growers, Huron, and Cloverleaf,
neither of those two elements existed. The court did not find congressional intent to preempt
state law, nor were the state and federal laws enacted for the same purpose.
214. 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
215. See supra notes 201-28 and accompanying text.
216. Cloverleaf Butter Co., 315 U.S. at 162.
217. Id.
218. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 145 (1962). The Court
there held that minimum federal standards over agricultural commodities could not be dis-
placed absent congressional intent where the state has regulated in the interest of the "consum-
ers of the commodity within the State." Id. The same argument can be applied to public state
workers who have an interest in what investments the state makes for its employees' pension
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pension is an important one that the state should be able to regulate.
It is undisputed that the state regulations go further than the federal
sanctions, but the state regulations have not been specifically invali-
dated by Congress and they are in the interest of the people of
California.
The Court has also invalidated state laws that go further than
federal laws. In Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association v. De la
Cuesta, a recent and very lengthy opinion, the Supreme Court held
that a federal regulation preempted state law even though there was
no actual conflict in the sense of physical impossibility. 21 9 In this case
a federal law allowed the savings and loan associations to enforce due-
on-sale clauses220 but did not compel savings and loans to enforce
them. The California law did not allow due-on-sale clauses to be en-
forced. 221 Therefore, a savings and loan association could follow both
laws by not enforcing the due-on-sale clause. This appears to be very
similar to the sanctions against South Africa. A company could fol-
low both the federal and California laws by divesting itself of South
African investments even though such a drastic measure is not re-
quired by the federal laws.
At this point, however, the similarity between De La Cuesta and
the anti-apartheid laws stops. In De La Cuesta, the Court, after not-
ing that there was no impossibility in complying with both laws at the
same time, went on to hold that the California law nevertheless con-
flicted with the federal law because the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board had expressly intended to give the savings and loans flexibility
and the state law deprived them of this.222 The express intention was
found in the language of the regulation and its preamble 223 which
stated that savings and loans would be governed exclusively by federal
law without regard to conflicting state laws.224 This type of explicit
funds, and that state regulations of investments in South Africa are in the interest of the "con-
sumers" of those funds.
219. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
220. Id. at 145-46. Due-on-sale clauses allow the lender to declare that the balance of the
loan is due when the property is sold or transferred. This allows the lender to expire old loans
and issue new ones at the current interest rate. Id. This became important in the early eighties
when interest rates were rising and lenders needed to issue loans at higher interest rates in
order to be able to pay out higher rates and attract investors.
221. Id. at 148-49.
222. Id. at 155.
223. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 157-58 (discussing 41 Fed. Reg. 18,286-87 (1976)). The
Court further held that a federal regulation is just as preemptive as a law. Id.
224. Id.
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intent, on which the Court relied to preempt state law in De la Cuesta,
does not exist in the federal Anti-Apartheid Act.
Furthermore, the De La Cuesta Court also rested its opinion on
the fact that the state law stood as an obstacle to the accomplishment
of federal objectives. 225 These objectives were to give the saving and
loan institutions the option to enforce due-on-sale clauses to maintain
their economic stability. 226 The state law denied them this option
and, therefore, completely thwarted Congress' purpose. This is not
the case with the anti-apartheid laws. The state laws may impose ad-
ditional requirements, but these additional requirements do not stand
as obstacles to Congress' purpose of eliminating apartheid.
In another recent case, Golden State Transit v. City of Los Ange-
les,227 the Supreme Court invalidated a city regulation that went fur-
ther than the federal laws. 228 In doing so, the Court found that the
City of Los Angeles had regulated in an area that Congress had inten-
tionally left unregulated. 229 The case involved a taxi cab company
that sought to renew its franchise with the City of Los Angeles. 230
The employees of the cab company had gone on strike and Los Ange-
les conditioned the franchise renewal on the company's ability to set-
tle the strike.231 The Court held that this interfered with the
congressional purpose behind the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA).232 Relying on both the language of the NLRA and its legis-
lative history, 233 the Court found that Congress had intentionally left
this area of labor/management disputes unregulated to maintain a
balance between the negotiating powers of labor and management. 234
While Congress had specifically contemplated some state regulation
in this area, the city had not shown that this was a contemplated
regulation. 23
5
The Supreme Court's invalidation of the city regulation in
Golden State Transit that went further than the federal regulation
does not mean that the Court will strike down the state and local
225. Id. at 156.
226. Id. at 154-55.
227. 475 U.S. 608 (1986).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 615-19.
230. Id. at 609-10.
231. Id. at 610-11.
232. Id. at 613-18.
233. Id. at 615-19.
234. Id. at 616.
235. Id.
720 [Vol. 10:693
South African Sanctions
actions against South Africa because, by requiring divestment, they go
further than the federal laws. In Golden State Transit, the Court
pointed out that Congress, when promulgating the NLRA, had in-
tended some areas to be unregulated. Essentially, the conscious deci-
sion not to regulate operated in itself as a regulation; the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) with Congress' authority, had regu-
lated for a free area. Congress has not done this with the South Afri-
can sanctions. It is not clear either from the language of the Act or its
legislative history that Congress, by not requiring divestment, was not
allowing divestment. Congress merely voted down an amendment for
divestment with no evident reason.236 Furthermore, in Golden State
Transit, there was a Board set up specifically to regulate in this area.
Where Congress has set up an office, the courts are much more likely
to interpret the absence of a regulation as preempting state regulation
in that area. 237 With the South African sanctions, Congress has not
delegated any authority to a regulatory agency and therefore the like-
lihood of preemption is lessened.
Moreover, the holding in Golden State Transit is bolstered by the
Court's decision in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachu-
setts.238 There, the Court upheld a state regulation against both Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and NLRA
preemption. The state law required insurance plans to cover mental
health, while the federal law, ERISA, did not.239 The Court stated
that this was not preempted by ERISA because it came within one of
the specific exemptions to ERISA's broad preemption. 240 As for the
second challenge, appellants argued that the NLRB had not regulated
in this area intentionally, so as to maintain a balance of negotiating
power between management and labor. They claimed that the state's
regulation upset this balance by giving employees a benefit for which
they did not have to bargain. 24' Noting that there was no specific
language mandating preemption, the Court derived congressional in-
tent from the purpose of the NLRA and by examining whether Con-
gress had so occupied the field as to leave no room for state
236. 132 CONG. REC. SI 1,839 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2338 (Nov. 1986).
237. L. TRIBE, supra note 151, at 387.
238. 471 U. S. 724 (1985).
239. Id. at 730.
240. Id. at 732-33.
241. Id. at 747-51.
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regulations.242 In holding that the state laws did not conflict with
congressional purpose, the Court relied on the presumption that Con-
gress did not intend to preempt traditional areas of state concern.
243
Regulating the contents of insurance contracts was traditionally a lo-
cal concern, and it did not interfere with the negotiating process.
244
The Court further stressed that the NLRA had been enacted in light
of state regulation of insurance and that it was unlikely that Congress
intended to displace all state laws.
245
This case illustrates that absent explicit or implicit congressional
intent to preempt state laws, the Court will not use federal laws to
preempt state laws that regulate further than the federal laws. As in
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., the state South African sanctions do
not conflict with Congress' purpose; rather, the state laws supplement
the federal objectives. Indeed, the case for preemption was arguably
stronger in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. than in the South African
situation. There, Congress intentionally did not regulate certain areas
so that they would be free for negotiation. The state regulation, by
mandating mental health care, took those areas out of the realm of
negotiation. With the South African laws, although Congress did not
regulate to the extent of the states, Congress was not trying to set up a
precarious balance of power that the state laws undercut.
Additionally, Congress, in enacting the South African sanctions,
acted in an area that states and cities had already begun regulating.
Since these regulations are for local interest within the police powers
of the states and cities, the presumption is in favor of their survival.
Absent intent from Congress to preempt state laws that it knew ex-
isted, state laws are still valid. Although there is some congressional
intent to preempt the state sanctions against South Africa, there is
also the opposite intent. With knowledge of these various state ac-
tions it is very likely that Congress would have done something more
if it had intended to preempt them.
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. ,246 is another example of the Court's
willingness to uphold state laws that impose additional requirements
than parallel federal laws. In Ray, the Supreme Court invalidated the
portions of a Washington state law that conflicted with the federal
shipping statute but upheld some requirements of the Washington law
242. Id. at 746-47.
243. Id. at 740.
244. Id. at 754-55.
245. Id. at 756-58.
246. 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
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that regulated shipping and did not conflict with the federal law. The
state had imposed a requirement on tankers. Those that did not com-
ply with the state's designs, even though they complied with the fed-
eral statutes, had to have a tug boat pull them into the harbor.247 The
Supreme Court upheld this requirement reasoning that even though
the Washington law imposed an additional cost on the owners of
tankers who did not meet the state's standards, it would not induce
the owners to change the design on their tankers. 248 The Court also
held that although the tug requirement might appear to be a penalty
to tankers that do not comply with the state's design standards, it was
valid because it was not "'an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.' "249
Similarly, while Los Angeles' refusal to do business with entities
that have ties with South Africa may be an inducement to those entiti-
ties to cut those ties or even a penalty for their continued support of
the apartheid system, these actions are not an obstacle to Congress'
purpose. Quite the contrary, they work in tandem with Congress to-
wards the same goal - elimination of an oppressive government. The
requirement that companies wishing to secure contracts with the City
of Los Angeles must discontinue doing business with South Africa is
"in no way inconsistent with the [sanctions] as [they are] currently
being implemented. ' 250 The state and municipal sanctions should not
be invalidated just because an entity complying with the federal sanc-
tions might not be complying with state and city sanctions where the
state's sanctions are consistent with the underlying federal purpose.
3. Conflicting Purposes
Besides an actual conflict and a conflict that is an obstacle to
congressional objectives, the Supreme Court has also focused on the
purposes of the state and federal statutes to determine whether the
laws conflict. Where the federal government has legislated for a spe-
cific purpose, a state that imposes regulations that are different from
the federal laws but were enacted for the same purpose is preempted
by the federal government.2 5' "The Supremacy clause dictates that
247. Id. at 171-73.
248. Id. at 173 n.25. The tug requirement would cost an additional $227,000 a year
whereas changing the design of a tanker to meet the Washington law would cost $8,000,000
per tanker.
249. Id. at 173 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
250. Ray, 435 U.S. at 173 n.25.
251. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); Ray v. Atlantic
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the federal judgment . . . prevail[s] over the contrary state
judgment." 252
In Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,253 the Court
upheld a Detroit ordinance that required inspection of federally li-
censed ships.254 The purpose of the city's ordinance was -to control
pollution.255 The Court held that the inspection ordinance was not
preempted by federal inspection laws because the federal laws were to
ensure the safety of seagoing vessels.256 Because the city ordinance
was for a different purpose, it did not bow to federal law. The Court
held that controlling air pollution was "peculiarly a matter of state
and local concern," and that it was within the city's police powers to
regulate this area. 257 It should also be noted that it was possible to
follow the city and the federal laws at the same time.258 In Ray v.
Atlantic Richfield Co.,259 the Court struck down the state's design,
tonnage and pilotage regulations for tankers under the Huron ration-
ale; the federal scheme "thus aim[ed] precisely at the same ends as
[did the Washington State law]. ' '26°
As for the South African sanctions, the federal government has
stated that the purpose is to initiate an end to apartheid in South Af-
rica.261 The State of California, while denouncing the system of
apartheid in South Africa, has also stated as a purpose the need to
protect the state's investments in a "rapidly deteriorating political cli-
mate" that will have an adverse impact on state money invested in
firms that do business in South Africa. 262 The purpose of the Califor-
nia statute, in addition to bringing about an end to an oppressive gov-
ernmental system,263 is to protect the state financial stability. 26
4
Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 164 (1978); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
252. Ray, 435 U.S. at 164.
253. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
254. Id. at 441-42.
255. Id. at 445.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 446.
258. The local law prohibited some federally licensed ships from entering the state's ports.
Id. at 451 n.3 (Douglas, J., dissenting). However, if the federally licensed vessels complied
with the more stringent city standards, they would not then necessarily be in conflict with
federal law.
259. 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
260. Id. at 165.
261. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440 § 4, 100 Stat. 1086,
1089.
262. 1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 1254(g).
263. Undeniably this is one of the purposes of the state's law. The introduction to the law
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Similarly, the Los Angeles city ordinance opens with a preamble
recognizing the oppressiveness and injustice of apartheid. 265 The city
ordinance also clearly states that the purpose of its laws is to allow the
City of Los Angeles to make its own economic decisions based on the
market participant doctrine.266 Thus, although the ultimate goal of
all three laws is the same - the elimination of apartheid - the stated
purposes are different. The courts should accept these stated purposes
as the actual rationale for enacting the laws.
267
In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conserva-
tion and Development Commission,268 the Court upheld a California
law269 requiring energy companies to find a permanent storage site for
the disposal of radioactive nuclear waste before the state would allow
energy companies to build nuclear reactors.270 The federal laws
which exclusively regulated the safety of nuclear power plants did not
require energy companies to have a permanent storage site located for
disposal of the waste before being issued a license to build the reac-
tor.27' The California legislature stated that its law was for economic
not safety purposes. 272 Rather than "attempting to ascertain Califor-
nia's true motive[s]," the Court "accept[ed] California's avowed pur-
pose."' 273 The Court stated that inquiring into the true legislative
motive for enacting the law was "pointless" because what motivates
one legislator into voting for a law does not necessarily motivate an-
other.274 Here, California's purpose is to protect the state fisc from a
volatile and unstable economy. This may not be the sole purpose of
the law, but it is an actual purpose.
275
adamantly deplores apartheid as "repressive," "repugnant to the principles of individual lib-
erty," and "inconsistent with the moral and political values of the people of California." Id.
ch. 1254(h).
264. Id. ch. 1254(g)-(h) & (j).
265. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
266. Los ANGELES, CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, art. V; see also, supra notes 116-
17, 128-44 and accompanying text.
267. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 216 (1983).
268. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
269. Id. at 203.
270. Id. at 194.
271. Id. at 217.
272. Id. at 213-14.
273. Id. at 216.
274. Id.
275. In Pacific Gas & Electric, the Court did not require that the avowed purpose be the
sole purpose. The Court in Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, upheld a Detroit City ordinance that
imposed additional requirements on federally licensed ships because the "sole" aim of the
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In Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles,276 the Court
invalidated a city regulation that regulated a local concern, transpor-
tation.277 The Court held that the regulation was prohibited under
the NLRA which regulated management/labor disputes.278  The
Court did not deny the local character of the city's regulation nor that
it regulated for a different purpose. 279 This can be distinguished from
the states' and cities' laws against South Africa. In Golden State
Transit, the city's regulation was intentionally prohibited by Con-
gress.280 The fact that it regulated for a different purpose than the
federal law did not validate the city's law where that regulation was
prohibited. Congress, in enacting the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid
Act did not specifically prohibit states from enacting their own laws.
The federal government can deny funds to states and cities that enact
anti-apartheid laws, but that power does not prohibit the laws them-
selves. 28  Here, the state laws and their purpose differ from the fed-
eral laws. For these reasons and because Congress did not prohibit
them, local sanctions should be upheld under an ordinary preemption
theory.
A different purpose also helped save the state laws requiring
mental health care in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 282 The Court
stated that the purpose of the NLRA to balance wage bargaining, did
not conflict with the purpose of the state law, which was to protect
the health and safety of residents.
28 3
Because the purposes of the federal and state anti-apartheid laws
are different, the court should follow its approach in Huron, Ray, Pa-
cific Gas & Electric, and Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. The state
and local governments did not enact the laws to regulate the same
purpose as the federal laws. The federal laws aim exclusively at elimi-
nating apartheid, whereas the state and city laws are intended to en-
sure financial stability. The federal government has exercised its
ordinance was controlling pollution. 362 U.S. 440, 445 (1960). After Pacific Gas & Electric,
the Court would not seem to require that the sole purpose of the state or city law be one that
does not conflict with federal law, if indeed the Court ever did require a sole aim.
276. 475 U.S. 608 (1985).
277. Id. at 619-20.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 611-12.
280. Id. at 613-17.
281. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440 § 606, 100 Stat.
1086, 1115.
282. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
283. Id. at 758.
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judgment with respect to regulations that seek to end apartheid and
state laws enacted for this purpose would have to cede to the federal
judgment. However, the federal government has not sought to regu-
late so as to preserve the financial stability of states and their subdivi-
sions. In this area, there is no superior federal judgment to which the
states and cities must defer. Because the state and local laws seek to
regulate for a different purpose than the federal laws, the purposes do
not conflict. Since it is not impossible to satisfy the federal and the
state regulations simultaneously, the state and local laws are valid.
C. Federal Intent to Occupy the Field
Whether Congress has occupied the field is evidenced through
congressional intent. To determine Congress' intent, the courts look
to the language, the scope and the detail of the statute, and the legisla-
tive history.284 Where Congress specifically preempts state and local
laws within the language of the statute or in the legislative history,
there is no issue to resolve.285 With regard to the South African sanc-
tions, Congress did not clearly state in the Act that it intended to
preempt state laws. Therefore, the court must derive the intent of
Congress elsewhere.2
86
The courts also look to the legislative history to determine
whether Congress intended to preempt state laws.287 Although Con-
gress may not specifically state that it preempts state laws in the legis-
lative history, the type of legislation and the arguments from the
House and Senate may lead the courts to believe that it was Congress'
actual intent to preempt. This was the case in Ray v. Atlantic Rich-
field Co.288 In that case, Atlantic Richfield Co. was challenging a
Washington state law that required ships licensed by the federal gov-
ernment to comply with additional laws that the state imposed. 289
284. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 358-59 (1976).
285. Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467
U.S. 461 (1984) (federal law regarding agricultural processor and producer bargains pre-
empted a state law that coerced producers to join associations was preempted by specific lan-
guage in the federal statute and legislative history); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218 (1947) (federal grain storage laws preempted state laws regarding federally licensed ware-
houses because Congress specifically intended to preempt to maintain uniformity).
286. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
287. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); Fidelity Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 142 (1982); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S.
151, 166-68 (1977); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1962); Napier v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926).
288. 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
289. Id. at 156.
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Nowhere in the bill or in the legislative history did Congress actually
state that the federal shipping laws preempted state laws. 290 Congress
had, however, expressed a desire for uniform international rules that
would facilitate trade. 291 By declaring that this was an area of inter-
national interest and not one for unilateral state standards, Congress
was saying that uniformity was important.292
Where Congress has expressed a need for uniformity, the courts
have historically held that it is an area of exclusive federal interest,
and that states can no longer regulate the area. 293 In Ray, uniformity
was important because international standards arrived at by treaty or
convention would facilitate trade since a vessel that met the standards
in the treaty could sail anywhere without having to meet different
design or weight requirements every time it entered a different port.
In the area of South African sanctions, it is clear that it is an area of
international interest because Congress has called to other nations to
enact sanctions.
294
However, it does not follow, as it did in Ray, that a desire for
international sanctions evinces a need for uniformity. Uniformity is
clearly vital to Congress' purpose in facilitating trade among nations.
Uniformity is not necessary for the purpose of issuing sanctions
against South Africa to eliminate apartheid. Sanctions do not need to
be uniform to work. In fact, to truly achieve the congressional pur-
pose and end apartheid, different sanctions could and should be en-
couraged. Stricter sanctions would produce a greater effect on the
South African government, while more lax sanctions, although not as
effective, would be better than nothing. Nor could Congress realisti-
cally expect that all states and nations could adopt the same sanctions
since different states and nations have different trade and production
problems and goals. Therefore, although in some instances a congres-
sional announcement that an area is one of international concern
leads courts to the conclusion that uniformity and hence exclusivity is
the congressional intent, this rationale does not apply to the South
African sanctions and it is not the approach that the courts should
take.
Courts have held that where the federal statute or scheme is "so
290. Id. at 160-64.
291. Id. at 166-68.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 107, 100 Stat.
1086, 1093.
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pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no
room for the States to supplement it,"295 the state law will be inva-
lid.296 Where Congress has given an agency a broad grant of power to
regulate in a particular field, the Court has held that the federal regu-
lations preempt state law even if there is no federal regulation specifi-
cally in conflict with the state regulations.
297
This was what the Court did in Napier v. Atlantic Coastline Rail-
road.298 Congress had given the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) power to regulate "the entire locomotive. ' 299 The ICC had
made numerous regulations for the safety of locomotives and their
passengers, but did not have regulations similar to those of Georgia
and Wisconsin. Georgia required an automatic door to close off the
firebox and Wisconsin required a curtain. 3°° The federal law was si-
lent on this point.30' The Court invalidated both state laws because of
the broad grant of authority given to the ICC.
30 2
The difference between this rationale and the issue of South Afri-
can sanctions, is that in Napier, there was a specific agency, the ICC,
that Congress had set up to deal with locomotive regulations. Where
Congress has given regulatory power to an office, the absence of that
office's regulations acts to preempt state law in an area that the
agency has decided not to regulate. 30 3 However, because Congress
has not delegated authority to a specific office to regulate the field of
South African sanctions, the decision not to regulate does not operate
to preempt state laws that regulate in the area. Therefore, under
Napier, Congress' decision not to require divestment of funds from
South African companies in no way eliminates the states' or cities'
ability to require divestment.
Further, Napier represents the willingness of earlier Courts to ap-
ply federal preemption to oust state laws. Recent Courts have been
much more reticent in applying the preemption doctrine. The Court's
opinion in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,304 exemplifies this shift. In
295. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
296. Id. at 230-31.
297. L. TRIBE, supra note 152, at 386; Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles,
475 U.S. 608 (1986); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
298. 272 U.S. 605 (1926).
299. Id. at 608.
300. Id. at 607.
301. Id. at 609.
302. Id. at 613.
303. See supra notes 239, 298-302, and infra notes 304-22 and accompanying text.
304. 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
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Ray, the Court struck down state laws that conflicted with the federal
vessel regulations, but allowed tug and design requirements where
there was no federal law in the area and Congress had given authority
to a federal office, the Secretary of Transportation. 30 5 In Pennsylvania
v. Nelson, 30 6 the Court held that the federal scheme was so pervasive
as to leave no room for local legislation because various other acts had
been enacted to regulate similar conduct.3 0 7 This case involved pre-
emption of Pennsylvania's sedition act by the Smith Act of 1940, The
Internal Security Act of 1950, and the Communist Control Act of
1954.308
The federal anti-apartheid sanctions regulate a large area: the im-
portation of Krugerrands, new investments in South Africa, loans to
South Africa, refusal of landing rights, import and export limitations,
and penalties for violating the statute.30 9 This could be evidence that
Congress has occupied the field and left no room for the states to
regulate. The legislative history and language of the Act may tend to
refute this.310 Nonetheless, Senator Lugar thinks that the federal Act
occupies the field. 31 I His view, however, met with opposition from
those who still believe that there is indeed room for state and local
action.
D. Area of Dominant Federal Interest
Where Congress has enacted legislation in an area that is of great
national interest, the regulation may preempt state law. Foreign rela-
tions is one of those areas. However, the Court has upheld state laws
that touch on foreign affairs under some circumstances.
1. States' Police Powers
The federal government may regulate an area and occupy a lim-
ited field while not precluding state laws altogether. 31 2 The states
maintain an interest in regulating the health, safety, and welfare of
their citizens even though the federal government has enacted regula-
305. Id. at 171-72.
306. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
307. Id. at 502.
308. Id. at 499, 503-04.
309. 22 U.S.C. §§ 5051-56, 5059-60, 5067, 5069-71, 5113 (Supp. IV 1986).
310. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
312. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960).
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tions that touch those areas. 313 Where the states have regulated
within their police powers, there is a presumption that the federal law
does not conflict with the state laws. 314 California's divestiture law is
aimed at protecting the state's pension funds by realizing the maxi-
mum return for the residents of California who have contributed to
the funds and will receive pensions at retirement.31 5 This is within the
state's police powers since it directly regulates the welfare of the
state's residents. Therefore, the presumption will be in favor of not
preempting state law. Under this rationale, the state anti-apartheid
laws should not fail.
2. Regulating Foreign Relations
Foreign relations is an area of predominantly federal interests.316
The need to project a united front to the nations of the world has
made foreign policy a federal area. Additionally, uniformity is often a
reason given for the federal interest especially in the areas of foreign
commerce and alienage.317 The Constitution puts states on notice
that in the area of foreign affairs the federal government has the domi-
nant voice. 318
These constitutional limitations do not completely curtail state
action in foreign affairs. In Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of
Detroit,3 19 the state regulation requiring inspection of federally li-
censed ships was not preempted by the federal inspection laws be-
cause the regulation was an "incident[ ] of local police power not
313. Id.
314. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); Ridgway v.
Ridgway, 454 U.S. 49 (1981); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983); Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
315. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
316. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497
(1956); De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
317. See supra notes 289-314 and accompanying text.
318. Congress has the power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations." U.S. CONST.,
art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Additionally, the Constitution prohibits some state action in foreign affairs.
The Constitution provides that "[n]o State shall, without the Consent of Congress lay any
Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports except as what may be absolutely necessary for
executing its inspection Laws..." Id. § 10, cl. 2. "No State shall, without the Consent of
Congress .... enter into any Agreement or Compact ... with a foreign Power." Id. § 10, cl. 3.
Although the state laws regarding South Africa do not fall into the category of Agreement or
Compact or as a Duty or Impost, the message of the Constitution is fairly clear-state's abili-
ties to conduct foreign policy is very limited. However, states do have the ability to promote
the interests of the states' residents.
319. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
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constituting a direct regulation of commerce. ' 320 Huron dealt with
the regulation of commerce, but an analogy can be drawn to the
South African laws since uniformity is a federal interest in commerce
as well as foreign affairs. Although the incidents of the state anti-
apartheid divestment laws may affect foreign relations, the laws are
not direct regulations on foreign affairs. The laws directly regulate
California's investments in South Africa, but this is a police power
within the state's ability to regulate. Therefore, the state laws do not
infringe on an area of dominant federal interest simply because the
operation of the state's police powers has an affect on foreign affairs.
The federal interest in foreign affairs is analogous to the cases
which deal with state laws regulating aliens. 321 The Constitution has
given Congress exclusive power to regulate the admission of aliens
into the country. 322 This is similar to Congress' exclusive power over
foreign affairs. Indeed, in Hines v. Davidowitz, 323 the Court stated
that the exclusivity in the regulation of aliens is based on the fact that
it is a component of foreign affairs.
324
Not every statute that has as its subject an area of federal interest
necessarily regulates that area of federal interest.325 In De Canas v.
Bica,326 the Supreme Court upheld a California statute that made it a
crime for employers to knowingly hire illegal aliens if it would operate
to take jobs away from lawful California residents. 327 Petitioners in
that case argued that since the California statute regulated aliens, it
was preempted by the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA)
328
because regulating aliens was an area given exclusively to the federal
government by the Constitution. The Court held that the California
statute did not regulate the admission of aliens into the country which
is what the INA did.329 Rather, the Court held that the California
law was tailored to protect the local fiscal interest and lawful resident
labor force from having to compete for jobs with illegal aliens who
320. Id. at 447.
321. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968);
De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
322. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
323. 312U.S. 52 (1941).
324. Id. at 62-63.
325. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976).
326. 464 U.S. 351 (1976).
327. Id. at 352 n.l.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 355.
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would drive wages down and take work from California residents. 330
This case makes a strong argument for upholding state and local
actions against investments in South Africa. Using the rationale of
the Court in De Canas, although foreign affairs is an area of national
importance, not every law that involves foreign affairs actually regu-
lates in an area of dominant federal interest. Here, the laws are aimed
at a foreign arena to protect local fiscal interests. The focus of the
laws is on local concerns of protecting the state's money so that Cali-
fornia residents will have funds available to support them in their re-
tirement years. Therefore, although the California law involves
foreign affairs, it does not regulate them.
Another factor to which the Court gave weight in upholding the
California law regulating the hiring of illegal aliens was the lack of
Congressional intent to preempt the state laws. 331 Nothing in the lan-
guage of the federal laws or in the legislative history in that case
evinced a congressional intent to preempt state laws aimed at regulat-
ing illegal alien labor. 332 The Court held that Congress' failure to reg-
ulate in that specific area or enact general laws did not justify an
"inference of congressional intent to pre-empt all state regulation in
the employment area. ' 333 The Court also noted that Congress had
intended to allow states to regulate employment. 334
Regarding the federal sanctions against South Africa, there is
congressional intent to preempt the state laws in the legislative history
330. Id. at 357.
331. Id. at 360-61.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 360 n.9. Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. seems to go against this proposi-
tion. 272 U.S. 605 (1926). There, the Court held that the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) had full authority to regulate all parts of trains using interstate lines and if the ICC did
not regulate, then the decision not to regulate preempted any state regulation. Napier can be
distinguished from De Canas on several counts. First, the state regulations under review in
Napier regulated the boiler in the trains for safety which was the same area that the ICC had
the right to regulate, whereas in De Canas, the state laws regulated employment and the fed-
eral laws were aimed at immigration in the sense of admission and stay in the country. Sec-
ond, Congress in Napier had given the ICC a very broad grant of authority to regulate, and it
had regulated everything from steam gauges on locomotives to the glass in the windows. Id. at
609 n. 1. In De Canas, the INA could regulate admission into the country and the right to stay,
employment had been left to the states.
334. Id. at 361. The Court cited the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 2051 (1970 ed. Supp. IV) which specifically allowed the states to regulate hiring of illegal
aliens. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 361-62 (1976). Although the Court noted that this
applied only to agricultural employment, it was "persuasive evidence" that the federal immi-
gration laws should not be taken to preempt state laws "on matters affecting employment of
illegal aliens." Id. at 362.
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and the language of the statute, but there is also the intent not to
preempt.335 According to De Canas, Congress' decision not to require
divestment of holdings in South Africa does not indicate that Con-
gress intended to preempt state laws that regulated in this area. Addi-
tionally, the California divestment statute is consistent with the
federal laws because it operates to further Congress' purpose. The
Court has stated that where state employment laws are consistent
with the federal immigration and naturalization laws, the state law
will fail only if Congress elaborated a clear purpose that the Federal
law preempted all state laws in that area.33 6 There is no clear and
manifest purpose of Congress to preempt state and local laws requir-
ing divestment from South African companies.
In Hines, the Court used preemption to strike down a Penn-
sylvania statute that required all aliens over eighteen to register annu-
ally with the state and carry an identification card. 337 Congress had
passed The Federal Alien Registration Act of 1940,338 which required
aliens fourteen years or older to register just once and did not require
aliens to carry registration cards.3 39 The federal Act also differed
from the Pennsylvania Act in that the federal Act did not make fail-
ure to register a crime unless it was willful or wanton, whereas the
Pennsylvania statute made it a crime on any account. 3 °
By invalidating the state law, the Court held that this was an
area of dominant federal interest because it dealt with aliens, an area
of exclusive federal power. 341 The Court stated that state laws may
have some validity regarding foreign relations. 342 However, although
states do have legitimate local interests, these interests do not exist in
areas "embracing our relations with foreign nations. ' '343 Under this
analysis, local actions against investments in South Africa may be in-
valid since they undeniably affect foreign nations. Not only would the
South African laws run into some difficulty, but the alien/employ-
ment laws in De Canas v. Bica 34 would not have been upheld under
335. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
336. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976).
337. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 59 (1941).
338. Id. at 60 n.5.
339. Id. at 60.
340. Id. at 60-61.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 63.
343. Id.
344. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
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this foreign affairs analysis of the Court in Hines. All of this can be
reconciled.
In Hines, the Court did not rest its entire decision to invalidate
the state laws solely on the fact that it regulated in an area of domi-
nant federal interest. Much of the opinion is devoted to the equal
protection issue of seeking out aliens and requiring them to carry stig-
matizing registration cards.345 Congress had explicitly decided not to
require aliens to carry registration cards. Thus, this part of Penn-
sylvania's law actually conflicted with the congressional intent behind
the federal laws. Further, the Court pointed out that where the states
are regulating people, as opposed to merely fiscal matters, such as
taxing, their powers are limited.346 Additionally, it recognized Con-
gress' desire for uniform alien registration laws.347 Therefore, the fact
that the states were regulating in an area of dominant federal interest
was not the only reason for invalidating the state's laws. Further-
more, the Hines Court was a much more activist bench than the pres-
ent Court or the Court in De Canas v. Bica, and was much more
disposed to using the preemption doctrine to strike down unpalatable
state laws.348 Finally, the Court decided that the state law would be
an obstacle to accomplishment of Congress' purpose for a uniform
"harmonious whole. ' 349
All of these factors help to reconcile the holding in Hines with
that of De Canas as well as giving support to the argument that the
local laws against South Africa should be upheld. Although the
South African laws may raise an equal protection issue, it is of a dif-
ferent sort than that in Hines. Here, the issue would probably arise
where cities do business with companies that do not have ties with
South Africa, but refuse to do business with entities that do have
South African holdings. This does not involve the type of individual
social stigmatizing in Hines. Some people who previously did not
know of a company's ties to South Africa may decide not to patronize
that company, but this is not the type of stigma that Congress was
trying to avoid in Hines. Congress in enacting the federal sanctions
against South Africa was not doing it to protect individuals from be-
ing stigmatized at all. And, since the state and local laws only involve
345. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 69-74 (1941).
346. Id. at 68.
347. Id. at 72-73.
348. See generally Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and
the Burger Court, 75 COL. L. REV. 623 (1975).
349. Hines, 312 U.S. at 72.
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the liberty to contract and there is no suspect class involved, such as
alienage, the local laws would be upheld on a rational basis analysis.
Congress has also failed to identify a need for uniformity in en-
acting the Anti-Apartheid Act as it did in enacting the Alien Regis-
tration Act. Additionally, there is no indication that local and state
laws prohibiting investment in South Africa will stand as an obstacle
to the accomplishment of Congress' goal, namely eliminating
apartheid. As previously mentioned, the state acts are more likely to
help rather than hinder this federal goal. Furthermore, the state and
local actions involve regulations regarding the state fisc as opposed to
individuals. The Court in Hines expressly recognized a greater state
power to regulate taxes than to regulate individuals.350 The state anti-
apartheid laws are more similar to the state's ability to tax since the
anti-apartheid laws involve state fiscal matters.
Finally, the philosophy of the Court has changed. Under the
Warren Court, many state laws were preempted by federal law. This
signified the expansion of federal powers after the Roosevelt adminis-
tration and a more liberal court. Conversely, the Burger Court re-
treated from the activist mode of the Warren Court. Principles of
federalism and state's rights have dominated the reasoning in the Bur-
ger Court which has been much less willing to displace state laws
under the doctrine of federal preemption. It is likely that these princi-
ples of federalism will continue to reign in the Rehnquist Court.
In Zschernig v. Miller, the Court invalidated an Oregon probate
law regarding foreign legatees.35 1 The Oregon law did not allow for-
eign heirs to inherit property if the foreign government would confis-
cate the property upon their return. 35 2 It also conditioned the ability
to inherit on reciprocity, that is, whether a United States heir could
inherit in that country. The Court did not object to the requirement
of reciprocity because it did not invade foreign affairs but merely had
"some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries. ' 353
The Court did however object to the confiscation requirement
because it involved "minute inquiries concerning the administration
of foreign law, ' ' 354 and determined that this had more than just an
incidental effect on foreign affairs. 355 In essence, what the Supreme
350. Id. at 68.
351. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
352. Id. at 430-31 n.1.
353. Id. at 433 (citing Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 516-17 (1947)).
354. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 435.
355. Id. at 441.
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Court was objecting to was the state court's power to look to the for-
eign laws and determine whether they were democratic or not.
3 56 If
the court disliked the foreign laws or found that they were not demo-
cratic, then the state court could refuse to allow a foreign heir to in-
herit under the state's probate laws. 357 According to the Supreme
Court, this served no legitimate local purpose and adversely affected
the federal government's ability to deal with those foreign govern-
ments.358 The Court also stated that absent the state laws, the state
courts would not be thrust into foreign inquiries.
The holdings in Zschernig do not apply to the state's South Afri-
can laws. The South African laws do not require courts to probe into
the laws of South Africa and determine whether or not they comport
with the court's ideas of democracy. Instead, the state legislatures
have issued directives requiring divestment of the states' pension
funds to protect their residents. As long as the law remains in effect,
the courts need only decide if there are investments in South Africa.
The legislatures, not the courts, will determine when the laws should
cease. The legislature will not decide this by probing into and inter-
preting South African law, but by determining if investments in com-
panies in South Africa are stable. This will involve minimal, if any,
inquiry into South African laws. Although the state laws will have
more than an incidental effect in South Africa, neither the courts nor
the legislatures are involved in interpreting and administering foreign
laws which was the Court's objection in Zschernig.
Unlike the state law in Zschernig, which served no legitimate
purpose, the state anti-apartheid law does serve a legitimate purpose
of ensuring that pension funds will be invested in stable economies so
that California residents can receive maximum yield at retirement.
Another difference between the local South African laws and the state
laws involved in Zschernig, is that the state anti-apartheid laws will
not place the state courts in an area of foreign concern to which they
would not otherwise have been subjected. Even without the state
laws, the courts, under the federal laws, would have had to look to
whether there are investments in South Africa. The state laws may
increase the volume of these inquiries but they do not create them.
The inquiry necessary under the state law is also consistent with that
356. Id. at 437-39 n.8.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 441.
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required by the federal laws and will therefore not disrupt or embar-
rass United States' dealings with South Africa.
What the Court seems to be saying is that a "dominant federal
interest," without more, is not enough to preempt state law. The
Court in De Canas, after recognizing a potential federal interest,
looked for congressional intent to preempt state law.3 5 9 In Napier v.
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., the Court preempted state law after
finding that Congress had occupied the field and there was a specific
intent to preempt state law.360 In Pennsylvania v. Nelson, the court
preempted state law after finding a dominant federal interest, an ac-
tual conflict with the federal law, and congressional occupation of the
field. 361 If this is indeed the case, then the state and local sanctions
will almost certainly survive. There is arguably no dominant federal
interest since the state laws regulate local problems within the state's
police power. Even if there were a dominant federal interest, there is
nothing else to supplement a preemption argument as the Court has
seemingly required. There is federal intent, but it is conflicting in the
legislative history and the language of the statute, the federal govern-
ment has not so pervasively occupied the field so as to leave no room
for the state laws, and there is no actual conflict between the state and
federal laws. The state and local laws meet none of the criteria that
mandate preemption.
V. CONCLUSION
The issue concerning federal preemption of state and local sanc-
tions against South Africa will arise because most state laws are
stricter than the federal laws. The California law requires the state to
divest its pension funds of all investments with ties to South Africa.
This is intended to both protect the pension funds from being un-
wisely invested and pressure businesses to withdraw from South Af-
rica, thus forcing the South African government to end its apartheid
regime. These are undeniably noble purposes. The Los Angeles ordi-
nance and the Disvestiture Plan require the city to divest its pension
funds, prohibit purchasing South African goods, and disallow city
contracts to be awarded to companies with business in South Africa.
The federal Act imposes import and export prohibitions along with
359. See supra notes 332-49 and accompanying text.
360. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
361. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
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other provisions to aid Blacks, but it does not go so far as to require
divestment.
The Court does not need to invalidate the state and local actions
under the supremacy clause. The Court will look to the Act and its
legislative history to determine whether Congress intended to preempt
state and local laws. However, this inquiry will not get the Court very
far. Congress, while noting dissatisfaction with the state and city
laws, recognized their continued existence. As for the legislative his-
tory, it reveals several attempts by senators to require federal preemp-
tion, yet it also discloses congressional opposition to federal
preemption. Because Congress' intent is unclear, the Court should
apply the preemption doctrine that it has developed. The state and
local actions should survive the Court's preemption test.
First, there is no actual conflict between the state and federal
laws. It is possible to follow them both without violating either. Nor
do the state laws conflict with the object and purpose of the federal
laws. If anything, the state laws enhance Congress' goal of eliminat-
ing apartheid.
Second, the state laws do not need to bow to superior congres-
sional judgment because they do not regulate for the same purpose.
The stated purpose of state and local laws is to protect the state fisc.
This is different than the federal purpose, which is to eliminate
apartheid. Certainly, no one would deny that eliminating apartheid is
also a main thrust of the state laws. Yet the Court should rely on the
stated purpose, which is to protect pension funds.
Third, even though the federal scheme is "comprehensive," there
is still room for state laws. Although there is conflicting congres-
sional intent here, the state laws did exist at the time Congress en-
acted the federal law and indeed the federal Act recognizes their
continued existence.
Fourth, the state laws, while having an effect on foreign relations,
regulate fiscal matters not foreign affairs. Even if the state laws are
seen as regulations on foreign affairs, which is a dominant federal in-
terest, that alone may not be enough to preempt the state laws.
Cinthia R. Fischer
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